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Introduction	  This	  research	  paper	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  project	  on	  law	  and	  time.	  I	  am	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  studying	  the	  time	  related	  concepts	  and	  assumptions	  that	  structure	  some	  of	  the	  key	  initiatives	  in	  the	  area	  of	  equalities	  regulation	  in	  the	  UK	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  Time	   fulfils	   certain	   legal	   and	   political	   functions	   in	   equalities	   law	   and	   policy,	  establishing	  the	  parameters	  through	  which	  a	  person	  might	  claim	  a	  legal	  identity	  in	  order	   to	   argue	   a	   discrimination	   case,	   for	   example,	   or	   providing	   a	   paradigm	   for	  thinking	   about	   the	   allocation	   of	   care	   responsibilities.	   Time-­‐related	   concepts	   put	  limits	   on	  what	   types	  of	   law	  people	   can	  use	   and	  what	  people	  need	   to	  do	   to	   access	  rights.	  For	  these,	  and	  many	  other	  reasons,	  studying	  the	  temporal	  assumptions	  that	  structure	   equality	   laws	   provides	   rich	   material	   for	   understanding	   what	   we	   think	  these	  laws	  can	  and	  should	  do.	  	  	  My	   book-­‐in-­‐progress,	   tentatively	   entitled	   Doing	   Things	   with	   Time:	   Legal	  
Temporalities	  in	  Equality	  Projects,	   focuses	  on	  specific	  equality	  projects	  as	   instances	  of	  temporalised	  law	  and	  politics	  Ȃ	  the	  unpaid	  care	  burden,	  for	  example,	  constituted	  and	  regulated	  as	  a	  means	  of	  balancing	  time.	  Yet,	  far	  from	  merely	  tracing	  how	  legal	  concepts	   and	   communities	   symbolise	   time,	   or	   how	   they	   use	   temporal	   concepts	   in	  their	  world-­‐making	  features,	  I	  am	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  materialisation	  of	  time	  and	  interconnections	  between	  time,	  matter,	  form	  and	  objects	  in	  the	  making	  of	  law.	  Key	  temporalities	  within	  work-­‐life	  balance	  law	  Ȃ	  balance,	  equilibrium,	  and	  flexibility,	  for	  example	  Ȃ	  therefore	  become	  amenable	  to	  inquiry	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  documents	  and	   documentary	   practices,	   administrative	   forms,	   and	   the	   form	   of	   law	   itself	   in	  materialising	   time	   alongside	   and	   in	   relationship	   with	   human	   legal	   subjects.	   As	  
ǣǮǯǢ	  ǯȋ	  1995,	  58).	  With	  this	   in	  mind,	  we	  might	  ask:	  how	  has	  work-­‐life	  balance	  percolated?	  What	  role	  have	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	   legal	   actors	   played	   in	   confabulating	   this	   temporal	  form?	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Work-­‐life	   balance	   has	   been	   materialised	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   ways,	   for	  inconsistent	  and	  sometimes	  incommensurable	  reasons,	  and,	  many	  times,	  outside	  of	  the	   rational,	   agentic	   actions	   of	   sovereign	   legal	   subjects.	   As	   a	   form	   of	   legal	   (and	  policy)	  temporality,	  it	  has	  emerged,	  I	  argue,	  through	  specific	  relationships	  between	  actors	  (human	  and	  non-­‐human)	  of	  different	  types	  at	  a	  range	  of	   levels.	  As	  such,	  the	  intellectual	  or	  political	  purchase	  of	  work-­‐life	  balance,	  its	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  response	  (if	  that	  is	  what	  it	  is)	  to	  questions	  of	  social	  reproduction	  and	  gendered	  dynamics	  of	  work,	  and,	  more	   importantly	  perhaps,	   its	  epistemological	  or	  heuristic	   status,	  must	  be	   questioned	   a	   lot	   more	   closely	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   disaggregated	   or	   provisional	  networked	   relationships,	   connections,	   and	   agencies,	   rather	   than	   through	   the	  paradigm	   of	   coherent	   (if	   not	   wholly	   effective)	   policy	   and	   legal	   reform	   that	  dominates	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  to	  date.	  	  	  Analysing	   the	   strange	   temporalities	   of	  work-­‐life	   balance	   provides	   a	  way	   of	   doing	  this.	  It	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  means	  to	  look	  both	  at	  and	  past	  balance,	  to	  take	  balance	  at	  its	  word,	  examine	  its	  form,	  and	  watch	  how	  it	  circulates,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  strange	  currents	  and	  ripples	  it	  creates.	  As	  I	  hope	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  this	  paper,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  present	  regulatory	  models	  and	  policy	  concepts	  is	  a	  set	  of	  understandings	  of	  time,	  and	  specifically	  temporal	  equilibrium,	  that	  have	  significant	  effects,	  and	  which	  are	  materialised	  in	  specific	  ways.	  	  As	  a	  feminist	  labour	  lawyer,	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  analysing	  the	  technical	  legal	  measures	  in	  this	  area	  for	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  they	  assume	  and	  help	  to	  constitute.	  Even	  the	  most	  mundane	  details	  of	  work-­‐life	  balance	  laws	   and	   policies	   present	   rich	   material	   for	   understanding	   bureaucratic	  conceptualisations	   of	   gender,	   time	   and	   value.	   If,	   as	   Lisa	   Adkins	   argues,	   temporal	  relations	   now	   provide	   the	   key	   ground	   for	   feminist	   theorising	   (Adkins	   2009),	   our	  attention	   should	   turn	   to	   what	   types	   of	   temporality	   structure	   legal	   and	   policy	  engagements	  with	  women's	  working	  lives.	  	  	  
Legal	  Temporalities	  
 	 Ǯ̵ al	  and	  political	  processes	  that	  reproduce	  norms	  of	  the	  family,	  citizenship,	  health,	  and	  work	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  time	  (Freeman	  2005,	  57).	  In	  more	  recent	  scholarship,	  
	Ǯ-­‐normativity':	  what	  she	  refers	  to	  
 Ǯ          productiv̵ ȋ	 ʹͲͳͳǡ ͵Ȍǡ        Ǯ descent	   and	   mundane	   workings	   of	   domestic	   life	   interlock	   through	   temporal	  schemes'	  (Freeman	  2011,	  xxii).	  Some	  examples	  of	  chrono-­‐normativity	  might	  include	  
  Ǯ̵ 	   of	   childhood,	   puberty,	   courtship,	   marriage,	  children,	   and	   retirement,	   from	   which	   we	   all	   deviate	   to	   greater	   or	   lesser	   extent	  during	  our	  lives;	  or	  the	  time	  of	  the	  working	  day	  and	  working	  week,	  shaped	  through	  contestation	  over	  labour	  rights	  and	  pay;	  or	  the	  tǡǡǮ
̵ǡǡǮ̵ǡǡǮ̵Ǥ	  	  
	   	  






Temporal	  Mechanisms	  or	  Provocations?	  Work-­‐life	   balance	   measures,	   conceived	   through	   critical	   feminist	   responses	   to	   the	  unequal	   allocation	   of	   undervalued	   care	   and	   the	   concomitant	   effects	   on	  women	   of	  labour	   market	   segregation,	   are	   temporal	   mechanisms.	   They	   challenge	   chrono-­‐normativity	   to	   the	   ext      Ǯ̵   ǣ working	  day	  facilitated	  by	  women's	  social	  reproduction.1	  Work-­‐life	  balance	  is	  also	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  social	  ideas	  of	  time	  have	  emerged	  through	  law	  itself:	  work-­‐life	  balance	  is	  inherently	  also	  a	  socio-­‐legal	  concept.	  Unsurprisingly,	  however,	  it	  has	  also	  been	   subject	   to	   a	   number	   of	   critiques.	   Despite	   the	   potential	   of	   work-­‐life	   balance	  laws	   to	   upset	   norms	   of	   care	   and	  work,	   feminist	   labour	   lawyers	   have	   argued	   that	  these	  mechanisms	   have	   instead	   reasserted	   gender	   roles	   within	   the	   family	   and	   in	  work	   and	   reified	   the	   position	   of	   women	   as	   the	   key	   agents	   for	   performing	   the	  
Ǯ̵     ȋ	 ʹͲͲ͸ȌǤ  work-­‐life	   balance	   initiatives	   have	   operated	  within	   an	   ideological	  matrix	   of	   family,	  household,	   and	  market	   relationships	  which	   is	   paradigmatically	  white	   (Lung	  2010;	  Lewis	  2000)	  middle	  to	  high	  income	  (Williams	  2005),	  and	  heteronormative,	  even	  as	  attempts	  to	  recognise	  queer	  family	  forms	  have	  become	  apparent	  on	  the	  face	  of	  some	  legislative	   reforms	   (Conaghan	   and	  Grabham	   2007ȌǤ   Ǯ-­‐sharing'	  or	  roles	  for	  fathers	  in	  care,	  work-­‐life	  balance	  can	  also	  be	  positioned	  amongst	  policies	  which	  increasingly	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐structure	  normative	  heterosexuality	  to	  maintain	  a	  concept	  of	  privatised	  social	  reproduction	  (Bedford	  2009).	  	  	  So	  for	  many,	  feminist	  scholarship	  and	  activism	  on	  social	  reproduction	  has	  not	  been	  mobilised	   in	   effective	   ways	   through	   legal	   and	   policy	   interventions	   on	   work-­‐life	  balance,	  which	  have	  not	   sufficiently	   re-­‐drawn	   the	   conceptual	   paradigms	  of	   labour	  law	  (e.g.	  Conaghan	  2004).	  But	  despite	  many	  feminist	   labour	  lawyers	  finding	  work-­‐life	  balance	  to	  be	  a	  problematic	  response	  to	  gendering	  processes	  within	  labour	  law,	  it	  nevertheless	  has	  been	  a	   fact	  of	   life,	   it	  has	  held	  a	  certain	  self-­‐evident	   truth	   in	  the	  field,	  and	  it	  has	  provided	  something	  Ǯ̵ǡǡto	   think	  otherwise	  about	  women's	  participation	   in	  the	  paid	   labour	  market	  (Weeks	  2011).	  	  	  
Materialising	  Law	  and	  Time	  It	   should	   be	   possible	   to	   hold	   in	   place	   this	   understanding	   of	   work-­‐life	   balance	   as	  provocation	   whilst	   also	   analysing	   the	   co-­‐constitution	   of	   legal	   and	   policy	  temporalities	   as	   specific,	   located	   instances	   of	   pragmatic	   governance	   or	  governmentality.	  Yet	   the	  question	   that	   still	   remains	  within	   this	  kind	  of	   analysis	   is	  how	  these	  temporal	  mechanisms	  come	  about,	  how	  they	  are	  created.	  My	  dilemma	  is	  how	   to	   think	   about	  what	   time	   looks	   like	   and	  what	   it	   does,	   where	   it	   comes	   from,	  where	   it	  goes,	  when	  the	  ontological	  and	  agentic	   field	   is	  populated	   just	  as	  much	  by	  
                                                 
1 Children	  have	  often	  been	  required	  to	  care	  for	  adults	  and	  others,	  and	  to	  work	  for	  pay	  of	  various	  types,	  but	  their	  exclusion	  from	  most	  policy	  on	  work	  and	  care	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper. 






matter,	   objects,	   the	   non-­‐human,	   as	   it	   is	   by	   humans.	   When	   agency	   is	   the	   domain	  
  ǡ     ǣ ǯ     
ǡǯrratives.	  As	  we	  know,	  this	  is	  a	  particular	  theory	  of	  agency	  and	  time,	  specifically	  it	  is	  modernity	  (Latour	  1993).	  As	  hardly	   need ǡ  ǯ  We	  Have	  Never	   Been	  Modern,	   for	  example,	   has	   been	   to	   provide	   an	   account	   of	   the	   condition	   of	   modernity	   and	   to	  reconstruct	   the	   separation	  between	  humans	   and	  nonhumans	   in	  order	   to	   arrive	   at	  what	  he	  terms	   Ǯǯȋ	  1993,	  14).	  As	  part	  of	   this	   task,	  Latour	  
Ǯoral	  frǯȋ	  1993,	  67),	  a	  
Ǯǯǡǡǡimportantly,	   the	   passing	   of	   time.	   Moderns,	   as	   Latour	   puts	   it,	   understand	   time	  passing	  as	  if	  it	  abolishes	  all	  that	  is	  left	  behind,	  yet	  they	  also	  want	  to	  keep,	  date,	  save,	  and	  display	  the	  past.	  This	  idea	  of	  time	  passing	  irreversibly	  is,	  as	  such,	  a	  technique	  of	  
ǡ  Ǯǯ    the	   natural	   and	   the	   social	   separate	   (Latour	   1993,	   73)Ǥ  ǯ ǡ the	  concept	   of	   time	   passing	   requires	   further	   interrogation.	   Furthermore,	   the	  modern	  approach	  to	  time,	  nature,	  and	  society	  allows	  them	  to	  hold	  in	  place	  two	  fields	  of	  time:	  one	  ahistorical	  field	  populated	  by	  universal	  and	  necessary	  things	  or	  forces	  of	  nature;	  the	  other,	  much	  more	  contingent	  field	  of	  human	  history,	  detached	  from	  things.	  	  	  Distilling	  ǯ	  work	  on	   time	  down	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	  paper,	   I	   think	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   delineate	   three	   propositions.	   First,	   time	   as	   such	   is	   not	   an	   overarching	  principle	   but	   the	   identifiable	   result	   of	   a	   provisional	   hooking	   together	   of	   elements	  into	   something	   that,	   in	  modern	   terms,	   looks	   cohesive	   (but	  which	   cohesiveness	   is	  always	   failing).	   Second,	   the	   passage	   of	   time,	   no	   matter	   how	   real	   and	   tangible	   its	  
ǡ    ǡ  ǡ    ǯpurification	  of	  nature	  and	  society.	  Third,	  temporalities	  are	  the	  result	  of	  connecting	  and	   filing,	   so	   that	   if	   we	   change	   the	   classification,	   a	   new	   temporality	   emerges.	   In	  order	  to	  more	  fully	  account	  for	  nonhumans,	  however,	  it	  also	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  sorting:	  	   We	  have	  never	  moved	  either	  forward	  or	  backward.	  We	  have	  always	  actively	  sorted	  out	  elements	  belonging	  to	  different	  times.	  We	  can	  still	  sort.	  It	  is	  the	  
sorting	  that	  makes	  the	  times,	  not	  the	  times	  that	  make	  the	  sorting.	  Modernism	  -­‐	  like	  its	  anti-­‐	  and	  post-­‐modern	  corollaries	  -­‐	  was	  only	  the	  provisional	  result	  of	  a	  selection	  made	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  agents	  in	  the	  name	  of	  all.	  If	  there	  are	  more	  of	  us	  who	  regain	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  our	  own	  sorting	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  belong	  to	  our	  time,	  we	  will	  rediscover	  the	  freedom	  of	  movement	  that	  modernism	  denied	  us	  -­‐	  a	  freedom	  that,	  in	  fact,	  we	  have	  never	  really	  lost.	  (Latour	  1993,	  76)	  	  Displacing	  the	  ontological	  split	  between	  nature	  and	  society	  also	  unmoors	  the	  idea	  of	  one	  overarching	   time	  and	   the	  necessity	  of	   time	  passing.	  Through	   the	  metaphor	  of	  
Ǯǯǡ






meetings,	   connections,	   juxtapositions	   of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   elements	   and	   agencies,	  human	  and	  nonhuman.	  Time	  does	  not	  push	  this	  forward.	  Instead,	  out	  of	  a	  teeming,	  knotted	  mass	  of	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  connections,	  new	  temporalities	  emerge	  and	  act	  and	  have	  effects.	  	  
The	  Legal	  Temporalities	  of	  Work-­‐life	  Balance	  If	   time	   is	   created	   through	   a	   sorting	   process,	   through	   connections	   among	   entities,	  then	   part	   of	   any	   analysis	   should	   include	   sorting	   processes	   that	   we	   choose,	   for	  
ǡǤǮ̵Ǯ̵ǡǯright	   to	   request	   flexible	  work	   contains	  much	   of	   interest	   for	   a	   feminist	   analysis	   of	  how	  legal	  temporalities	  are	  created	  and	  sustained.	  What	  does	  it	  mean,	  for	  example,	  
Ǯ̵ǡǡof	  bureaucratic	  and	  legislative	  approaches	  to	  gendered	  labour	  structures?	  	  	  
Resolution:	  A	  Reckonable	  Present	  Marieke	  De	  Goede	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  socio-­‐Ǯ̵ǡto	  finance	  capitalism,	  became	  possible	  partly	  through	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Dow	  Jones	   index,	  which	  helped	   to	  produce	   ideas	  of	   instantaneous	  adaptive	   change	  and	  hedgeable	   futures	   (de	   Goede	   2005).	   A	   similar	   ethnographic	   analysis	   of	   work-­‐life	  balance	   policies	   and	   laws	   might	   trace	   the	   interaction	   of	   feminist	   conceptions	   of	  social	  reproduction,	  time-­‐use	  surveys,	  sex	  discrimination	  laws	  and	  policies,	  and	  new	  theories	   of	   management	   such	   as	   TQM	   (total	   quality	  management)	  which	   valorise	  organisational	  adaptability	  and	  worker	  responsibilisation	  (Amoore	  2004),	  to	  create	  motivating	  social	  policy	  goals	  of	  equilibrium	  and	  adaptation.	  The	  confabulated	  logic	  of	  work-­‐life	  balance,	  a	  result	  of	  many	  different	   influences,	  seems	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  fundamental	   assumption	   that	   the	   constructed	   tensions	   of	   imbalance	   or	   dis-­‐equilibrium	   can	   be	   resolved.	   This	   type	   of	   resolution	   rests	   on	   a	   perceived	  equivalence	  between	  different	  forms	  and	  uses	  of	  time	  that	  at	  least	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  measurable	   on	   the	   same	   scale,	   so	   that	   time	   spent	   on	   social	   reproduction	   is	  analogous	  to	  time	  spent	  in	  paid	  employment.	  	  	  Feminists	   have	   long	   argued	   that	   time	   spent	   on	   care	   or	   domestic	   work	   is	   equally	  valuable	   to	   time	   spent	   in	   the	   formal	   economy.	  Work-­‐life	   balance	   policies	   are	   one	  logical	  extension	  of	  this	  argument:	  if	  time	  that	  has	  been	  excluded	  is	  to	  be	  included	  in	  some	   way,	   then	   it	   must	   be	   analogised.	   As	   the	   foreword	   to	   the	   recent	   Modern	  
Workplaces	  consultation	  put	  it:	  	   We	  want	  to	  create	  a	  society	  where	  work	  and	  family	  complement	  one	  another.	  One	  where	  employers	  have	  the	  flexibility	  and	  certainty	  to	  recruit	  and	  retain	  the	  skilled	  labour	  they	  need	  to	  develop	  their	  businesses.	  And	  one	  where	  employees	  no	  longer	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  rewarding	  career	  and	  a	  fulfilling	  home	  life.	  (BIS	  2011,	  2)	  	  






The	  horizon	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  temporality	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  hedgeable	  future	  that	  we	  find	   in	   finance	   capitalism,	   constructed	   through	   notions	   of	   risk,	   which	   creates	   a	  forward	   concept	   of	   time	   and	   then	   stretches	   into	   it,	   but	   an	   expanded	   concept	   of	   a	  reckonable	   present	   which	   stretches	   outwards	   and	   maintains	   an	   assumed	  equilibrium	   thro   Ǥ  Ǯ ̵ instantaneous	  change,	  then	  work-­‐life	  balance	  requires	  adaptive	  negotiation.	  	  	  The	   point	   at	  which	   this	   analysis	   has	   to	   engage	  with	   law	   is	   the	   point	   at	  which	  we	  assess	  the	  significance	  of	  legal	  technique	  and	  legal	  form	  to	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  time.	  Within	   the	   legal	   and	   policy	   sphere	   in	   the	   UK	   since	   the	   early	   to	  mid-­‐1990s,	  work-­‐life	   balance	   has	   been	   mobilised	   by	   the	   idea	   of	   empowering	   employees	   to	  negotiate	   flexible	   working	   with	   their	   employers.	   The	   current	   right	   to	   request	  flexible	   working	   in	   the	   UK's	   Employment	   Rights	   Act	   1996	   (ERA)	   allows	   certain	  employees	   with	   responsibility	   for	   a	   child's	   upbringing,	   or	   with	   other	   care	  responsibilities,	   to	  make	  a	   request	   to	  alter	   their	  working	  schedule.	  Under	  sections	  80F-­‐80I	  of	  the	  ERA,	  employees	  have	  the	  right	  to	  request,	  but	  not	  receive	  as	  such,	  a	  change	   in	   their	   terms	   and	   conditions	   such	   as	   a	   change	   in	  working	   hours,	   time	   of	  work,	  or	  place	  of	  work.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  ignore	  the	  generative	  functions	  of	  legal	  techniques	  such	  as	  the	  right	   to	   request.	   Since	   it	   has	   been	   in	   place,	   the	   right	   has	   created	   new	   means	   of	  sorting	  time	  within	  the	  context	  of	  employment	  relations	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  arguably	  it	  has	  also	  created	  new	  gendered	  relations	  in	  the	  workplace.	  Sara	  Jain	  has	  argued	  that	  typewriters	  contributed	  to	  a	  process	  of	  heterosexualisation	  of	  workplace	  relations	  in	   the	   twentieth	   century	   (Jain	   2006),	   and	   I	   am	   in	   the	   process	   of	   fieldwork	  which	  aims	  to	  assess	  whether	  and	  how	  documentary	  practices	  associated	  with	  the	  right	  to	  request	   (such	   as	   filling	   in,	   submitting,	   and	   considering	   forms)	   have	   created	   new	  gendered	   and	   heteronormalised	   social	   patterns	   at	   work,	   and	   new	   genres	   of	  temporality.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  flexible	  work	  request	  form	   in	   creating	   particular,	   gendered,	   social	   relations	   of	   time	   in	   this	   area.	   	   These	  temporalities,	  crucially,	  do	  not	  stem	  merely	  from	  the	  social	  interactions	  that	  flexible	  work	  requests	  engender,	  but	  instead	  are	  co-­‐constructed	  through,	  and	  constitutive	  of,	  fragile	  relations	  between	  forms,	  people,	  and	  law.	  	  Furthermore,	   this	  documentary	   route	   to	  achieving	   flexible	  work	   as	  a	  precursor	   to	  achieving	  balance	  is	  an	  interesting	  mix	  of	  private	   law	  and	  legislated	  right.	  As	  such,	  the	  form	  of	  law	  is	  just	  as	  interesting	  as	  the	  documents	  it	  generates.	  This	  particular	  form	   ǯ working	  arrangement,	  a	  consideration	  that	  is	  otherwise	  not	  strictly	  necessary	  in	  the	  contractual	   negotiations	   that	   surround	   the	   individual	   employment	   relationship	   in	  the	  UK.2	  In	  this	  way,	  UK	  legal	  mechanisms	  of	  work-­‐life	  balance	  are	  themselves	  rich	  sources	  of	  information	  about	  regulatory	  understandings	  of	  gender,	  value,	  time,	  and	  
                                                 2	  Thank	  you	  to	  Judy	  Fudge	  for	  helping	  me	  to	  clarify	  this	  point.	  






the	  place	  of	   law,	  questions	  which	  are	  being	  asked	   in	  a	   range	  of	   scholarship	   in	   the	  fields	   of	   law,	   anthropology,	   and	   governance.	   In	   her	   recent	   analysis	   of	   the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  banking	  system	  in	  Japan,	  for	  example,	  Annelise	  Riles	  refers	  to	  
̵       Ǯ ̵  responsibilise	   banks,	   leaving	   a	   new	   order	       Ǯ ̵(Riles	   2011).	   The	   idea	   was	   that	   the	   new	   technology	   would	   encourage	   banks	   to	  control	   their	   risk-­‐taking	   practices.	   This	   was	   a	   specifically	   bureaucratic	   vision	   or	  hope,	   which	   relied	   on	   bureaucrats'	   ability	   to	   see	   the	   banking	   system	   as	   a	   whole.	  Similarly,	   successive	   groups	   of	   bureaucrats	   in	   the	   UK's	   Department	   for	   Business,	  Innovation	   and	   Skills	   (BIS),	   and,	   I	   would	   argue,	   policy	   makers,	   many	   of	   them	  feminists,	  have	  created	  a	  system	  of	  delegated	  negotiations	  between	  employers	  and	  employees	   in	   the	   right	   to	   request,	   through	  which	  actions	  of	   autonomous	  and	  self-­‐interested	   market	   participants	   are	   seen	   to	   create	   beneficial	   or	   self-­‐correcting	  economic	  effects	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  labour	  marketǤǮ̵the	   right	   to	   request	   flexible	   work	   does	   not	   amount	   to	   a	   direct	   right	   granted	   by	  legislation	   to	   receive	   a	   flexible	   working	   arrangement	   as	   such.	   It	   depends	   on	   a	  further	   step,	   the	   request,	  which	  mobilises	  a	   semi-­‐regulated	  private	   law	  process	   in	  which	  the	  role	  of	  the	  employer	  is	  central.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  right	  to	  request	   evidences	   a	   wish	   to	   dis-­‐entangle	   bureaucratic	   involvement,	   or	   keep	   it	  partially	   away	   from	   a	   market	   which	   is	   perceived	   already	   to	   have	   self-­‐regulating	  functions.	  	  As	  such	  the	  right	  could	  evidence	  an	  almost	  Hayekian	  appreciation	  of	  the	  self-­‐regulating	   functions	   of	   private	   law	   negotiations,	   happening	   in	   so-­‐ Ǯ
ǯ.	  	  	  Recent	   proposed	   changes	   to	   the	   right	   to	   request	   have	   universalised	   the	   right	   to	  request	  and	  further	  embedded	  it	  within	  this	  logic	  of	  private	  ordering.	  In	  May	  2011,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  economic	  crisis	  and	  on	  the	  back	  of	  a	  pro-­‐Ǯ̵ǡ̵centre-­‐right	   Coalition	   government	   announced	   a	   new	   consultation	   on	   reforming	  work-­‐life	   balance	   law.	   Entitled	   Modern	   Workplaces,	   the	   consultation	   was	   the	  
̵   Ǯ       ̵Ǥ3	  It	  covered	   four	  main	   policy	   areas:	   flexible	   working,	   flexible	   parental	   leave,	   working	  time	   and	   equal	   pay.	   Self-­‐consciously	   aware	   of	   perceived	   shifts	   in	   the	   gendered	  arrangements	  of	  work	  and	  care,	   the	  consultation	  contained	  extensive	  proposals	   to	  change	  the	  administration	  of	  maternity	  and	  paternity	  ǡǮ̵
Ǯ̵     ǡ    ȋ  European	  Union	  case-­‐law),	  and	  introducing	  changes	  to	  the	  scope	  and	  administration	  of	  flexible	  working,	  amongst	  other	  things.	  Significantly,	  in	  what	  might	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  bold	   and	   progressive	   move,	   the	   Coalition	   government	   proposed	   in	   the	   Modern	  
Workplaces	   consultation	   to	   expand	   the	   availability	   of	   the	   current	   right	   to	   request	  flexible	  work,	  making	  it	  available	  to	  all	  employees,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  have	  a	  care	  obligation.	  These	  proposals	  are	  now	  contained	   in	  the	  Children	  and	  Families	  Bill	  2013,	  which	  is	  currently	  making	  its	  way	  through	  the	  UK	  Parliament.	  
                                                 
3 BIS	  press	  release,	  16	  May	  2011. 






	  This	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  shift	  to	  undermine	  the	  gendering	  of	  care-­‐related	  requests	  in	  the	  workplace.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  could	  be	  read	  as	  an	  equality	  move,	  albeit	  based	  on	  something	  akin	  to	  a	  formal	  equality	  model:	  if	  anyone	  can	  make	  a	  request	  for	  flexible	  work,	   then	   the	   gendering	   of	   unpaid	   care	   is	   apparently	   challenged.	   However,	   this	  shift	   is	   just	   as	   much	   to	   do	   with	   private	   law	   and	   the	   logic	   of	   labour	   market	  equilibrium	   as	   it	   is	   to	   do	   with	   shifts	   in	   conjugal	   work	   and	   care	   models.	   In	   the	  Parliamentary	  debates	  around	  the	  Children	  and	  Families	  Bill,	  government	  ministers	  persistently	  adopt	  the	  idea	  of	  flexible	  work	  as	  economic	  strategy.	  Edward	  Timpson,	  Parliamentary	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Children	  and	  Families,	  for	  example,	  put	  it	  as	  follows	  during	  the	  second	  reading	  of	  the	  Bill	  on	  25	  February	  2013:	  	  We	  believe	  that	  supporting	  strong	  families	  and	  introducing	  flexible	  working	  practices	  is	  key	  to	  achieving	  business	  and	  economic	  growth.	  A	  new	  system	  of	  shared	  parental	  leave	  will	  support	  business	  by	  creating	  a	  more	  motivated,	  flexible	  and	  talented	  work	  force.	  Flexible	  working	  will	  also	  help	  widen	  the	  pool	  of	  talent	  in	  the	  labour	  market,	  helping	  to	  drive	  growth.4	  	  	  Now,	  this	  rhetoric	  is	  not	  new.	  It	  echoes	  similar	  rhetoric	  used	  by	  the	  previous	  Labour	  governments.	  However,	  it	  is	  worthy	  of	  analysis	  for	  what	  it	  indicates	  about	  how	  the	  dilemma	   of	   unpaid	   care	   is	   conceived	   at	   legal	   and	   policy	   levels.	   The	   Coalition	  government's	   rationale	  appears	   to	  be	   that	   flexibilising	  working	   relations,	   allowing	  employees	   some	   lee-­‐way	   in	   determining	   their	   own	   working	   hours	   and	   working	  arrangements,	   brings	   talented	   people	   into	   workplaces,	   creates	   opportunities,	  promotes	   economic	   activity	   and	   assists	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   growth	   in	   the	   new	  economy.	   The	   logic	   of	   such	   a	   move	   is	   neatly	   aligned	   with	   market-­‐oriented	  approaches	   to	   labour	   regulation,	   in	   which	   rational	   market	   actors	   negotiate	   their	  own	  optimum	  terms	  and	  conditions.	  This	  idea	  of	  the	  market	  is	  also	  infused	  with	  an	  understanding	   of	   social	   reproduction	   which	   positions	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   care	  dilemma	   as	   a	   key	   means	   of	   promoting	   economic	   growth.	    ǯ extends	   Hayekǯ         social	  reproduction;	   the	   idea	   is	   to	   give	   people	   the	   freedom	   to	   resolve	   the	   contradiction	  between	  care	  and	  work	  and	  such	  individual	  flexibility	  will	  lead	  to	  economic	  growth.	  .	  	  
Flexibility	  Requests:	  A	  Modulated	  Suspension	  of	  Certainty?	  Such	   a	   view	   of	   the	   right	   to	   request	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   pre-­‐	   and	   post-­‐reforms,	   it	   still	   sets	   no	   particular	   temporal	   standards,	   as	   such,	   around	   the	  arrangement	   of	   working	   time.	   Instead,	   the	   framework	   provides	   a	   space	   for	  individuated	  arrangements	  with	  specific,	  and	  staged,	  temporal	  qualities.	  The	  right	  to	  request	  process	  begins	  with	  an	  employee	  filling	  in	  a	  flexible	  working	  request	  form	  (or	  similar	  document)	  and	  submitting	  it	  to	  their	  employer.	  The	  employer	  must	  then	  call	  a	  meeting	  within	  twenty	  eight	  days	  to	  discuss	  the	  form,	  and	  they	  must	  make	  a	  
                                                 
4 Hansard,	  Commons	  Debates,	  25	  February	  2013,	  column	  49. 






decision	   about	   the	   request	   within	   fourteen	   days	   of	   the	   meeting.	   Employers	   can	  refuse	   requests	   only	   for	   business	   reasons	   outlined	   in	   the	  ERA,	   for	   example,	   if	   the	  new	   working	   pattern	   would	   adversely	   affect	   quality	   and	   performance.	   If	   the	  employer	   refuses	   a	   request	   on	   incorrect	   facts,	   or	   for	   a	   reason	   that	   is	   not	   listed	   in	  section	  80G	  ERA,	   the	  employee	  can	  make	  a	  complaint	   to	  an	  Employment	  Tribunal	  for	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  original	  application	  or	  for	  compensation.	  	  The	   logic	   of	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   process	   encourages	   something	   akin	   to	   the	  modulated	  suspension	  of	  certainty	  that	  Latour	  perceives	  in	  his	  ethnographic	  study	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  Conseil	  D'État.	  Latour	  remarks	  that	  legal	  processes	  within	  the	  Conseil	   produce	   a	   sort	   of	   homeostasis,	   a	   sense	   of	   everything	   being	   covered	  
Ǯ  ̵ǡ  	   processes	  which	   leave	   voids	   (Latour	  2010,	   114).	   Homeostasis	   evokes	   the	   ability	   to	   maintain	   a	   constant	   through	   the	  adjustment	   of	   other	   features	   of	   a	   system.	   Arguably	   the	   temporal	   horizon	   of	  homeostasis	   does	   particular	   work	   within	   Latour's	   analysis.	   Legal	   processes,	   and	  hence	   conseillers,	   labour	   under	   an	   obligation	   to	   ensure	   legal	   predictability	   (or	  securité	   juridique).	   To	   some,	   predictability	   might	   imply	   a	   progressive	   or	  consolidating	   temporal	   narrative:	   certainty	   filters	   in	   through	   the	   ambience	   in	   the	  Conseil,	  is	  strengthened	  through	  legal	  process,	  and	  then	  finally	  established	  in	  the	  act	  of	   judgment.	  A	   lack	  of	   certainty	   gives	  way	   to	   a	   relative	   sufficiency.	  But	   this	   is	   not	  how	   Latour	   describes	   it.	   In	   fact,	   on	   Latour's	   analysis,	   legal	   predictability	   happens	  through	   the	   fabrication	   of	   doubt	   and	   distancing	   -­‐	   in	   other	   words,	   through	   the	  strategic	  avoidance	  of	   certainty.	  As	  Latour	  puts	   it,	   these	  distancing	  procedures	  are	  
        Ǯs	   doubted	   properly'	   (Latour	   2010,	   94).	  Having	   suspended	   certainty,	   and	   indeed	   actively	   fabricated	   doubt,	   a	   curious	  completeness	   takes	   over	   law:	   homeostasis,	   a	   type	   of	   all-­‐encompassing,	   self-­‐adjusting,	   temporality	   (Latour	   2010,	   113),	   produced	   through	   a	   multitude	   of	  adjustments	  and	  changes	  in	  pace.	  From	  the	  present	  (post-­‐judgment)	  vantage	  point,	  the	  legal	  principle	  confirmed	  through	  proceedings	  at	  the	  Conseil	  is	  as	  it	  has	  always	  been,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   entire	   process	   was	   pursued	   through	   means	   of	   a	  graduated	  suspension	  of	  certainty.	  	  Such	   a	   suspension	   of	   certainty	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   process	   of	   applying	   for,	   and	  deciding	  on,	  a	  request	  for	  flexible	  work	  under	  the	  ERA,	  characterised	  through	  time	  periods,	  the	  exchange	  of	  documents,	  and	  the	  apparent	  open-­‐minded	  deliberation	  of	  the	   employer.	   However,	   according	   to	   the	   ERA,	   the	   employer	   must	   then	   make	   a	  decision	  within	  fourteen	  days	  of	  the	  meeting.	  At	  this	  stage	  of	  legal	  proceedings,	  the	  decision	  is	  final.	  It	  either	  results	  in	  an	  entirely	  new	  contract	  or	  the	  reassertion	  of	  the	  old	  contract.	  In	  fact,	  once	  the	  new	  contract	  exists,	  the	  dilemmas	  that	  motivated	  the	  negotiations	  under	  the	  old	  contract	  have	  become	  impossible	  to	  mobilise	  legally.	  This	  is	  definitely	  not	  a	  flexible	  legal	  scheme	  in	  the	  normal	  sense	  of	  the	  word.	  The	  right	  to	  request	   only	  provides	   flexibility	   to	   shift	   to	   a	   new,	   on-­‐going,	   seemingly	   permanent	  but	   legally	   indeterminate,	   working	   regime,	   and	   no	   guarantee,	   on	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   to	  shift	   back	   or	   shift	   again	   when	   required.	   This	   technical	   legal	   mechanism	   can	   only	  






currently	   be	   exercised	   once	   every	   twelve	   months.	   As	   such,	   the	   employer's	  deliberation,	  the	  employee's	  submission	  to	  time	  periods	  and	  form-­‐filling,	  and	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	   time	   of	   the	   new	   contract	   all	   contribute	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  flexible	  work	   request	   as	   inaugurating	  a	   type	  of	   staged	   legal	  homeostasis.	  This	   is	  a	  strange	  and	  contradictory	  legal	  temporal	  mechanism:	  a	  right	  to	  negotiate	  only,	  for	  a	  form	  of	  flexibility	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  new	  permanent	  working	  arrangement.	  
	  
Concluding	  Remarks	  Work-­‐life	  balance	  laws	  and	  policies,	  themselves	  embedded	  in	  mutating	  networks	  of	  gender,	  labour,	  and	  value,	  have	  a	  range	  of	  contradictory	  logics	  and	  significant	  social	  effects.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  insistent	  demands	  of	  two,	  perhaps	  three	  generations	  of	  feminists,	   for	   example	   through	  wages	   for	  housework	   demands,	   some	  might	   argue	  
       Ǯ̵    visions	  of	  re-­‐valuing	  social	  reproduction	  into	  restrictive	  practices	  of	  negotiation	  and	  exclusion.	  Those	  women	  who	  find	  their	  way	  through	  increasingly	  complex	  eligibility	  requirements	  to	  claim	  the	  right	  to	  request	  flexible	  work	  in	  UK	  law,	  for	  example,	  are	  met	  with	   onerous	   processes	   of	   form-­‐filling,	   negotiation,	   and	   time	   periods,	   raising	  concern	  over	   the	   transformative	  potential	  of	  work-­‐life	  balance	   laws.	  Certainly,	  my	  own	   approach	   over	   recent	   years	   has	   become	   increasingly	   critical	   of	   ideas	   of	  
Ǯ̵Ǥ	  	  Scholars	   who	   are	   concerned	   with	   questions	   of	   social	   reproduction	   and	   labour	  
 Ǯǯfound	   in	   legal	  mechanisms	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	   request	   flexible	  work	   are	   no	   less	  feminist	  because	  they	  are	  based	  on	  a	  logic	  of	  market-­‐oriented	  solutions.	  Those	  of	  us	  who	  might	  wish	   for	  more	   radical	   solutions	   to	   the	  unpaid	   care	  dilemma	  also	  need,	  first,	   to	   understand	   how	   it	   is	   that	   feminist	   conceptions	   of	   social	   reproduction	  contribute	   to	   this	   hybridised	   legal	   mash-­‐up,	   and	   second,	   to	   accept,	   to	   a	   certain	  degree,	  that	  this	  strange	  legal-­‐conceptual	  model	   is	  a	  fact,	  worthy	  of	  close	  attention	  on	   its	  own	  behalf.	   It	   is	  strange	  enough,	  as	   it	   is,	   to	  be	  worthy	  of	  considerably	  more	  research	  attention	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  legal	  form	  and	  temporal	  assumptions.	  	  If	  we	  pay	  this	  kind	  of	  attention	  to	  legal	  work-­‐life	  balance	  mechanisms,	  we	  find	  that	  form-­‐filling,	  negotiation,	  and	   legislated	  time	  periods	  are	  themselves	  constitutive	  of	  time.	  They	  create	  (legal)	  temporalities	  through	  a	  process	  akin	  to	  what	  Latour	  would	  
 ǮǯǤ  ǡ       -­‐life	   balance	  projects,	  it	  remains	  necessary	  to	  understand	  their	  temporal	  assumptions	  and	  logics.	  The	  picture	  that	  emerges	  is	  confusing,	   involving	  a	  range	  of	  contradictory	  temporal	  mechanisms	   -­‐	   legalised	   homeostasis,	   flexibility	   through	   permanence,	   for	   example.	  Yet	   by	   looking	   closely	   at	   legal	   technicalities,	   we	   can	   discern	   much	   about	   the	  conceptual	  logic	  that	  affects	  many	  of	  us	  through	  influential	  regulatory	  strategies.	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